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Abstract
The dynamics of collective decision making is not yet well understood. Its practical relevance however can be of utmost
importance, as experienced by people who lost their fortunes in turbulent moments of financial markets. In this paper we
show how spontaneous collective ‘‘moods’’ or ‘‘biases’’ emerge dynamically among human participants playing a trading
game in a simple model of the stock market. Applying theory and computer simulations to the experimental data generated
by humans, we are able to predict the onset of such moments before they actually happen.
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Introduction
The existence of forecasting patterns in asset prices has, for
obvious reasons, been a widely explored and discussed topic in the
financial industry as well as academic literature. It should however
be noted that the majority of the documented cases refer to ex
post analysis, see [1–3]. In order to study the general problem of
the dynamics of collective decision making and eventually predict
the outcome of an aggregate decision making before a general
‘‘consensus’’ is reached, we suggest considering a very simple
model of the stock market. As it will be shown, we provide a
method for finding pockets of predictability in the decision making
when humans are made to trade according to the setup of the
model. Besides we offer a rationale of the humans’ behavior that
drives the majority of them to a temporary synchronization.
In financial markets the returns of asset prices are believed to be
temporally independent, meaning that today’s return does not
predict in any way the sign of tomorrow’s return. This is especially
the case when it is assumed that investors’ expectations are
unbiased [4,5]. In the 60 s and 70 s such assumption paved the
way to the efficient market hypothesis, arguing that future returns
cannot be predicted from past returns or any other market-based
indicator [6]. However, findings of behavioral economics
challenged this assumption showing that people tend to make
systematic cognitive errors when forming expectations, as it can be
seen in the case of representativeness or anchoring heuristics [7–
10]. Other research also shows that people tend to create
speculative price bubbles independently of the experimental
setting [11–13]. This means that under some circumstances, the
investors’ expectations tend to become biased [14] and once they
are biased – they become predictable.
Temporal loss of people’s capability to adapt is especially
common during a rapid change of a trend. If we apply this rule to
investment decisions in financial markets, a sudden trend change
can lead to a severe decrease of investors’ performance and a
subsequent evaporation of fortunes. During regular performance
of the market, on the contrary, active, short-term investors react
dynamically to incoming information [15,16]. While making
predictions about the future state of the market they often analyze
past price changes, what is called technical analysis. Predictions
based on technical analysis are usually sensitive to the next
outcome of the market; a different recommendation will be given
in case of a positive or negative change of price in the consecutive
time step. However, under some specific market history it is
possible that no matter what the next state of the market, the
investor’s strategy will recommend the same decision, i.e., buy or
sell. In such situation, the decision is independent of what will
happen next - it appears to be decoupled from the immediate
market change. An investor is no longer influenced by the
incoming information because all information will drive them to
the same conclusion, making the market predictable. We call this
cognitive mechanism ‘‘decoupling’’ and will give its precise
definition below.
We hypothesize that when a majority of investors experience
decoupling, the market dynamics changes dramatically. Investors
become locked in their positions, and their decision heuristics are
immune to disconfirming information. They become incapable of
reacting to alarming signals what consolidates their synchroniza-
tion, or even leads to the creation of bubbles or anti-bubbles
(continuous increases or decreases of prices).
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In the following we will show a method by which soft human
decision heuristics can be formalized in terms of decision rules of
agents in an agent-based simulation of the financial market called
the $-Game ($G). The general idea is to have a framework in
which one can study the dynamics of collective decision making,
knowing the factors relevant for the decision making of an
individual. The problem will be presented in a simple model of the
stock market, but the questions posed belong to the general
domain of collective decision making, where the aggregate choice
feeds back on the formation of individual choices.
Within the simple agent-based model of the stock market, we
run a Monte Carlo simulation and demonstrate that:
N First of all, decoupling can lead to biased price formation that
may evolve into bubbles or anti-bubbles.
N Secondly, the detection of decoupling allows to detect biased
price behavior before a bubble (or anti-bubble) appears.
In experiments with uniquely human participants, we show that
in an analogous setup the subjects follow similar price dynamics as
agents in simulations, which is indicated by the appearance of
bubbles or anti-bubbles. Moreover, when we used data generated
by humans as input for the artificial agents, we show that:
N Decoupling can explain the synchronization of human
subjects.
N Ratio of decoupled strategies used by artificial agents can
predict (with high probability) the creation of a speculative
price bias by humans.
The $-Game: a model of a financial market and a
mathematical formulation of human decision heuristics
We have chosen the $G because, first of all, it is an extremely
simple model of financial markets. Secondly, the rules of the $G
facilitate the emergence of collective speculative biases – the
market phenomena whose dynamics we want to explore and
understand. In the following we therefore explain its rules in detail
[17].
Specifically the $-Game is described by just three parameters
(N, m, s):
N N - Number of agents (market participants)
N m - ‘‘Memory’’ used by the decision making of the agents. The
parameter m represents the past number of days used by the
agents in their decision making of whether to buy or sell an
asset. Therefore, m is the length of the signal used in the
decision making, see Table 1.
N s - Number of strategies held by the agents
In the $G, agents can either buy or sell one unit of stock at each
time step; they are assumed to have an unlimited amount of
money and stock. The decision making of buying/selling a stock is
given by strategies which are reference tables [18]. An example of
a strategy is shown in Table 1. A strategy tells what decision to take
(either buy or sell) depending on the past price history of up
(represented as ‘‘1’’) and down (represented as ‘‘0’’) price moves.
At each time step t agent i uses his/her optimal (i.e. best
performing in terms of payoff, see definition below) strategy
out of the s available to make an action ai (t) of either buying
(ai (t)~1) or selling (a

i (t)~{1) a stock. Notice that choosing
the optimal strategy at each time step (indicated by the *)
renders the model highly non-linear, since as the market
changes the pool of optimal strategies also changes, which
thereby in itself changes the market price behavior. The order
imbalance at time t is given byA(t)~
PN
i~1
ai (t). The return, r(t),
is assumed proportional to the order imbalance:
r(t)~A(t)=lwith l being the liquidity. The payoff function
Gij for the j’th strategy of an agent i is updated at each time step
according to DG
j
i (t)~a
j
i(t{1)
PN
k a

k(t)~a
j
i(t{1)r(t)l. From
the last equation one can see the reason for the name of the
$G: assuming that a strategy recommended buying at time t21
(i.e. a
j
i(t{1)~1), then it depends on the return in the following
next time step, r(t), whether this recommendation turns out to
be profitable or incurring a loss.
In short, the fitness of the $G strategies is determined by how
well they predict which way the market will move one time step
ahead. The idea is that strategies that are able to forecast the next
market moves will thrive in terms of wealth and eventually,
through evolution, become the ones that determine future market
moves.
Without any constraints on the amount of money or the number
of stocks available to the agents, the optimal state for all players is
such that all agents cooperate and make the same decision (either
buy or sell). This is a Nash equilibrium for the $G given by
Keynes’ ‘‘Beauty Contest,’’ where it becomes profitable for the
agents to guess the actions of the other participants and mimic
their decisions (for a derivation of this solution see Appendix S1).
In addition to decision making based on technical analysis, it
would seem natural to include in the model decision making based
on the future expectations of dividends, as it is done in the rational
expectations approach. This can easily be added to the model by
assigning strategies based on fundamental analysis [19–20].
However, the aim of the present study is to consider the dynamics
of pure collectively created speculative behavior. In relation to
financial markets, one can therefore think of our experiments as
done in such a short time scale, that no new information, which
could change future expectations of dividends or risk aversion
appears. Therefore the fundamental price is constant throughout
the experiments and equals the arbitrary price value chosen at
time t = 0. The optimal state of the $G is the solution in which the
price deviates exponentially in time from the fundamental value of
the asset, since in this state all agents either profit from constant
price increases by buying shares (this state we define as a ‘‘bubble’’)
or from constant price decreases by selling shares (this state we
define as an anti-bubble). However, finding the optimal solution
requires coordination between the agents to enter and stay in such
states. Coordination is not intentional; rather, it emerges as a sum
of independent decisions of agents choosing optimal strategies.
These optimal strategies presented in the reference tables lead to
the same action, which on an aggregate level means synchroni-
zation.
Table 1. Decision table showing an example of a strategy
that uses m= 2 recent time steps.
price history action
00 +1
01 21
10 +1
11 +1
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050700.t001
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Strategies of the agents, at a first glance, are very different from
what we know about decision heuristics of humans [21,22], which
are captured in terms of verbally (or rather propositionally [23])
formulated conditional rules. Clearly, humans are cognitively
incapable of precisely representing the many vectors and exact
sequences of market dynamics needed to represent and valuate the
strategies. However, the reverse formalization of human decision
heuristics by reference tables is simple and any conditional rule of
human reasoning can be represented this way. To accept the
notion that strategies of the agents represent human decision
heuristics we need only to assume that each agent’s strategy depicts
in an algorithmic way the implementation of a decision heuristic
that humans would specify in a higher-level language.
Decoupling and synchronization
Before we present the experimental setup and results in more
detail, we must first define the notion of decoupling. Some
strategies represented by reference tables have a unique property:
the actions that they recommend are decoupled from the incoming
information. Let m!m(t) denote the price history of the last m up
and down movements at time t. A strategy is called (1-time step)
decoupled, if the action of the strategy at time t+2, a( m!m(tz2)),
does not depend on m!m(tz1). If a( m!m(tz2)) does depend on
m!m(tz1) the strategy is called coupled to the price history [24].
Decoupling of a strategy means that different patterns of market
history lead to the same decision (i.e. buy or sell), regardless of
whether the market went up or down in the time step preceding
the one in which the decision is to be made. The most interesting
in the mechanism of decoupling is, as we will show, that it gives a
handle to predict biased price behavior before it can be seen in the
price data.
The strategy in Table 1 is one time step decoupled conditioned
on the price history m!m(t)~(01) at time t, because independently
of whether the market at time t+1 goes up ((01)R(11)) or down
((01)R(10)), the strategy will recommend buying at time t+2. This
means that every time we see an occurrence of the price history
where the market first went down (0), then up (1) we know for sure
what action this strategy will recommend two time steps ahead. In
a hypothetical game with only one agent and only one strategy,
that presented in Table 1, we would know with certainty what the
agent would do at time t+2 if the price history at time t was (01),
independently of the price movement at time t+1.
So far we showed how an analysis of the agents’ strategies could
lead to momentary predictability of their future actions. But
knowing for sure what one, or even several agents will do, does not
guarantee being able to predict what will happen at the level of the
market.
To know for sure how the market will behave, we need to
encounter a situation in which not only are a majority of agents
decoupled, but they need to be decoupled in the same direction. At
any time t, the actions of agents can be thought of as coming from
either coupled or decoupled strategies. The order imbalance can
be written in terms of two distinct contributions:
Am(t)~A
m(t)
coupledzA
m(t)
decoupled . The condition for certain predictability
of what will happen one time step ahead is therefore
DAm(t)decoupled (tz2)Dw
N
2
because in that case we know that, given
the price history at time t, the sign of the price movement at time
t+2 will be determined by the sign of Am(t)decoupled (tz2).
Whenever the conditionA
m(t)
decoupled (tz2)w
N
2
is fulfilled we say
that the system has synchronized. A priori, it is highly nontrivial
whether this condition will be fulfilled at any point in time. If the
agents play their strategies randomly, the condition is never
fulfilled [24]. Decoupling therefore has to be related to the
dynamics of pricing, which somehow imposes that the optimal
strategies of agents will be attracted to regions in the phase space
of strategies that have decoupled ones. In the $G, the two most
trivial strategies with actions either all +1 or all 21 are natural
candidates to be attractors. However, because it is very unlikely for
an agent to possess either of these two strategies, an attractor
would necessarily have to consist of regions in the phase space of
strategies where one finds strategies highly similar to those that
have all actions either +1 or 21.
In terms of the decision heuristics of humans, decoupling may
be translated as a cognitive mechanism called cognitive closure
which affects market players who stick to their long term decision
regardless of what happens in the near future. After observing
certain patterns of market dynamics, investors may come to the
conclusion that the market trend is set and, further, that the
temporary market reversals are not indicative of the real market
trend. For example, if the market player judges that the market is
trending upwards, then the increase in price serves as a
confirmation of the expected trend, so the decision is to buy. If
the price drops, it is perceived as a momentary deviation from the
governing trend, which indicates immediate correction, so the
decision is also to buy.
Results
Experimental design
Our experimental procedure is designed to investigate the
emergence of collective speculative bias, and to demonstrate how
agent-based simulations can be used to explain and predict it. We
first performed multi-agent Monte Carlo simulations (i.e., no
human decision making was involved) to study the theoretical
aspects of speculation in the $G. Secondly we performed
experiments with human subjects playing the $G, without the
involvement of artificial agents (i.e., the experiments were done
uniquely with human subjects). Finally we used data generated by
humans as input for the multi-agent Monte Carlo simulations. In
all three types of procedures (simulations, experiments on humans,
simulations with data from experiments on humans), the rules of
the $G were applied [17], and the parameters of the game were
the following: (a) the number of players N=11; (b) in the first trial
the length of the memory m=3, in the second trial m= 6 time
steps; (c) the strategies will be described in each of the procedures
separately.
Multi-agent computer simulations
We first examined the intrinsic properties of the $G with respect
to the creation of speculative biases. We focused on how often
decoupling would be the responsible mechanism leading to an
onset of bubbles/anti-bubbles. As shown in Appendix S1, the
optimal solutions of the $G (without any constraints on the agents
in terms of wealth/stock possessions) are either a bubble state, in
which a majority of agents buys a new asset at each time step, or
an anti-bubble state, in which a majority of agents short sells the
assets, in both cases to the benefit of the majority. We therefore
generated L=50000 Monte Carlo (MC) simulations of the $G
with fixed m and N corresponding to the two trials (m=3, N=11
and m=6, N=11). In every simulation, the total pool of the
strategies s held by an agent was random (1,s,50, with s being
drawn each time independently from a uniform distribution), and
the sub-pools of strategies assigned to each of the agents was also
randomly generated at the beginning of each game. Each of the
MC simulations was then run until either a bubble or an anti-
Investor Synchronization Caused by Decoupling
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 December 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 12 | e50700
bubble was created (a bubble/antibubble being defined as m
consecutive increases/decreases of the market).
For m=3, we found that 57% of the bubbles/anti-bubbles
entered a state of decoupling, whereas for m=6 54% of the
generated bubbles/anti-bubbles were in a state of decoupling. We
can therefore claim that decoupling is a sufficient but not necessary
condition for the occurrence of synchronization. To establish to
what extent the decoupling of agents’ strategies can act as an early
predictor of bubbles or anti-bubbles, we performed the following
numerical experiment. For each of the decoupled bubbles/anti-
bubbles, we studied, as a function of time tb - t, the percentage
rzbubdecoupled of decoupled optimal strategies used by agents at a given
moment that recommend a decision along the direction of the
bubble/anti-bubble, as well as the percentage r{bubdecoupled of
decoupled optimal strategies with decisions in disagreement with
the direction of the bubble/anti-bubble. The time of the onset of a
bubble/anti-bubble, tb, is defined as the moment at which the
price begins to constantly increase or decrease. The average value
of tb depends only on the length of the memory, and we found that
it can be scaled as vtbw!2m.
The plots presented in Figure 1 show a splitting in the agents’
use of the different optimal decoupled strategies (solid and dotted
lines), which indicates an onset of speculative bias in computer
simulations of the $-game. The splitting as a function of time
allows to predict the presence of a speculative bias before it can
be seen in the price history generated by the agents. It is
remarkable that for m=6 a clear split is observed as early as 20
time steps before tb; it should be noted that until tb+m21, any
predictability is nontrivial because only at time tb+m do the agents
encounter m price changes in the same direction.
Experiments with human subjects
In experiments with human subjects one of the main questions
was whether the behavior of humans would be similar to that of
the artificial agents, with respect to the spontaneous formation of
speculative bias. Although the optimal solution in the $-Game is
given by the formation of bubbles/anti-bubbles, we know that
even in simple games people do not always find the Nash
equilibrium. The experimental literature is full of examples of
games in which the observed behavior quickly converges to
equilibrium, as well as games in which equilibrium is a persistently
poor predictor of humans’ behavior [25]. In case of a successful
reproduction of synchronization among human subjects playing
the $G, we hypothesized that coordination between subjects,
which triggers bubbles or anti-bubbles, is associated with the
subjects’ ignorance of the incoming information, corresponding to
the agents’ decoupled strategies.
The experiments were conducted on humanities students at the
University of Warsaw. The experiment was conducted in eight
groups, each composed of 11 participants. Before the participants
logged into the game, they were informed about the details of the
experiment with both verbal and written instructions, and asked to
give informed consent. Participants were instructed to play the $G,
i.e., to make buy/sell decisions according to their predictions of the
future price movement (see the Method section and Appendix S2
for a detailed description of the procedure and instructions given
to the subjects).
To test the hypothesis concerning the investors’ loss of
adaptability to incoming information (the sensitivity to the
direction of price change during the bubble/anti-bubble state)
we manipulated the direction of the price change at some point in
the game. In four out of eight groups (nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8) the
experimenter modified the sign of the price change to the opposite
of the ‘real’ one derived from the players’ decisions, i.e.,
introduced false feedback. The participants were not informed
about this manipulation prior to the experiment. In two groups
(nos. 5 and 7) false feedback was introduced once, and in the other
two twice – every time after the subjects stayed for a longer time in
a bubble/anti-bubble state (at least 15 time steps of consistent ‘ups’
or ‘downs’). The introduction of a false feedback meant that the
subjects saw a response of the market opposite to what should have
resulted from their actions - a minus instead of a plus or vice versa.
All of the experiments involving human subjects were conduct-
ed following approval of the procedure granted by the Research
Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology, University of
Warsaw. To ensure anonymity of subjects informed consent was
obtained from all subjects in oral form.
In all but one group (88%) the participants managed to
synchronize, regardless of the length of the given history: six times
they created a bubble, and once (no. 7) they created an anti-
bubble. Only group no. 1 failed to create a bubble or an anti-
bubble but they did manage to create short periods of
synchronization, which could be the result of a ‘return to the
mean’ strategy [26]. This strategy says: ‘when the price keeps
increasing over (approx.) 5–6 time steps in a row, start selling, and
when the price keeps decreasing over (approx.) 2–3 time steps in a
row, start buying.’
Results of the experiments with human subjects confirm that in
the $G subjects are capable of coordinating to achieve a market
behavior that is most profitable for them, i.e., a monotonic series of
either constant buying or selling. However, contrary to artificial
agents they were also able to find other solutions than the pure
bubble/anti-bubble state.
Monte Carlo simulations input with data generated in
experiments with humans
Having performed the trading experiments with human
subjects, we used the price data generated in these experiments
as input to agent-based Monte Carlo (MC) simulations of the $G.
The MC simulations were performed with fixed m and N
corresponding to the two trials (m=3, N=11 and m=6, N=11),
a random number of strategies s, 1,s,50 (since a priori we do not
know the number of strategies used by the human subjects) and
their random initial realization (i.e. using a randomly generated
string of 0 s and 1 s with an equal probability of 0.5, see right
column in Table 1) of each of the s strategies. For each experiment
the price data generated in experiments with humans was used as
input price data used by the agents, and 50000 MC randomly
generated realizations were then used to make an average estimate
of rzbubdecoupled and r
{bub
decoupled .
Figure 2 shows how the rather sharp transition in the splitting of
the solid (rzbubdecoupled ) and dotted (r
{bub
decoupled ) lines over time can be
used to mark the onset of the speculative bias in the human trading
experiments before it is seen in the generated price history. Even
when a bubble is created very rapidly, we see a split (Figure 2A);
this split becomes clearer over a longer time period for the larger
memory length (m=6), in which case the subjects have a longer
period over which they trade in a descending market before the
final synchronization occurs (Figure 2C). This resembles real
markets, with a typical run-up/-down before a bubble/anti-bubble
sets in.
We found that this method of detecting decoupled strategies of
agents and predicting the synchronization of human subjects can
be used to discover not only bubbles or anti-bubbles but also short
moments of synchronization among the human subjects.
Figure 3 shows the course of the one experiment in which
human subjects did not generate a clear bubble or anti-bubble
Investor Synchronization Caused by Decoupling
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(group no. 1). Still by applying the same MC analysis as in
Figure 2, clear ‘‘peaks’’ in the value of rzbubdecoupled predict a price
increase before it is actually seen in the experiment. We found a
stunning 87% success rate of predicting a single move of the
market two time steps in advance. It is important to note that there
are no parameters used in the predictions, which were made out-
of-sample.
Finally we wanted to verify if decoupling corresponds to
moments of collective bias where the human subjects collectively
neglect incoming information, so we focused on the four
experiments, in which we manipulated the price change after a
clear price trend leading to a bubble/anti-bubble had been
established (introduction of false feedback). In two groups (5 and 7)
detecting decoupling among a majority of MC agents (75% and
65%) in the time step preceding the introduction of the false
feedback indicated that humans are in a state of decoupling, which
predicted that they would not react to a disconfirming piece of
information. Indeed, the humans did not react to the price
manipulations in these two cases. In the other two experiments
(groups no. 6 and 8), the low level of decoupling found in the MC
simulations at those moments made predicting human reactions to
false feedback impossible.
Discussion
We have performed trading experiments with human subjects to
study the dynamics of collective decision making in a simple model
of financial markets. The experiments show how certain sponta-
neous collective ‘‘moods’’ or ‘‘biases’’ can emerge dynamically.
Introducing a theoretical framework and applying computer
simulations to the data generated by the humans, we have been
able to detect the onset of such moments before they actually
happen in the experiments. Our experiments and theoretical
framework suggest new ways to access the pathways involved in
collective formation of speculative behavior.
Figure 1. Splitting in the agents’ use of different optimal decoupled strategies (solid and dotted lines) indicating an onset of a
speculative bias in computer simulations of the $-game. The splitting as a function of time allows predicting the presence of a speculative bias
before it can be seen in the price history generated by the agents. Solid line indicates the percentage of optimal decoupled strategiesrzbubdecoupled used
by agents who at a given moment recommend a trading decision along the direction of the bubble/anti-bubble. Dotted line indicates the
percentage r-bubdecoupledof decoupled optimal strategies with trading decisions in disagreement with the direction of the bubble/anti-bubble. Time is
normalized in such a way that the moment when a speculative bias begins (defined as the moment at which the price begins to constantly increase
or decrease) corresponds to t = tb. It is therefore not before t = tb+m (i.e., only after having observed m consecutive price increases/decreases) that a
collective speculative bias can be defined ex post from the price time series. The vertical dashed lines indicates this moment for length of memory
m=3 (graph A) and m=6 (graph B). The observation that a split between the solid and dotted lines occurs before the onset of a bubble (indicated by
tb) means that prediction of biased price movements in the game is possible before they are actually visible in the prices.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050700.g001
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Methods
Ethics Statement
All of the experiments involving human subjects were conduct-
ed following approval of the procedures (including oral informed
consent procedure) granted by the Research Ethics Committee of
the Department of Psychology, University of Warsaw. We chose
the oral informed consent procedure to ensure anonymity of
participants and because the research presents no more than
minimal risk of harm to the subjects and involves no procedures
for which written consent is normally required outside of the
research context. In order to obtain informed consent, the
following steps were conducted. First the experimenter explained
the procedure of the study to the potential subject verbally,
providing all important information: aim, rules of the game,
remuneration, duration. Then the potential participants were
given written instruction containing the description of the game
and their role in it, as well as time to ask any questions. Only then
the decisions whether or not to participate in the experiment were
made. The procedure of collecting informed consent was
witnessed by at least 10 other potential participants. Participants
who gave informed consent verbally were instructed to log into the
game. Each participant was assigned number from 1 to 11
according to the order they entered the game (numbers were not
revealed to participants).
Detailed description of the procedure in the experiments
with human subjects
The experiments with human subjects were conducted in one of
the computer laboratories at the University of Warsaw. The
subjects were students in humanities who responded to an
announcement about the study, or found out about it elsewhere
(e.g. from other participants) and expressed their willingness to
participate. Each experiment required the participation of 11
subjects, so altogether we gathered 88 participants (forming 8
groups), all of which declared a lack of experience in investing in
stock exchanges and no prior economic education.
The participants were first informed about the details of the
experiment and expressed informed consent to participate. Then
they were given instructions concerning the $G. They were told
that in each time step, their behavior influences the price. They
had no time limit for making their decisions, but they knew that at
Figure 2. Speculative biases in the price movements - indicated by circles - in experiments with human subjects. The onset of the
speculative bias was subsequently detected in Monte Carlo simulations with agents of the $-game trading on the price data generated by the
humans. The rather sharp transition in the splitting of solid and dotted lines over time (for definitions of the different lines see caption 1) can be used
to mark the onset of the speculative bias before it is visible in the price history. The lengths of memory used in experiments with human subjects
were m=3 (graph A and B) and m=6 (graph C).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050700.g002
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every time step the new price would be set only after everyone (all
11 subjects) had indicated their decisions (buy or sell). At each time
step, the price was the result of the subjects’ decisions and it was set
according to: return= (order imbalance)/liquidity, where the
order imbalance was the number of participants that bought a
share minus the number of participants who sold a share. Liquidity
was taken constant. At the beginning of the game, participants had
no information about the market or the price on the market.
During the game, participants had access to only four pieces of
information (same as artificial agents in MC simulations): (a) m last
price changes indicated by sequences of ‘‘+’’ and ‘‘2’’ (in the first
trial m= 3, in the second trial m= 6); (b) own last decision,
indicated by a ‘‘+’’ or ‘‘2’’; (c), own profit from the last decision;
and (d) own cumulative profit from the whole game. Each of the
experiments lasted up to an hour. Having finished the game, the
participants were remunerated for their participation. They
received 5 Polish Zlotys (PLN), which is the equivalent of
approximately $2, show-up fee and on top of that they were
given 1% of their virtual payoff from the game. This way the
subject could receive around 15pln altogether (approximately $6).
Supporting Information
Appendix S1 Optimal solution of the $-Game.
(DOC)
Appendix S2 Instructions given to the subjects in
experiments on humans (history m=3).
(DOC)
Figure S1 Screenshot of a representative game in time
step t= 1.
(TIF)
Figure S2 Screenshot of a representative game in time
step t= 2.
(TIF)
Figure S3 Screenshot of a representative game in time
step t= 3.
(TIF)
Figure S4 Screenshot of a representative game in time
step t= 4.
(TIF)
Figure 3. Illustration of a biased price evolution - indicated by circles - leading to ‘‘moments of predictability’’ in an experiment
with human subjects (group no. 1, length of memory m=3). This is the only experiment in which a clear bubble/anti-bubble was not created.
The price data generated in these experiments were used as input to agent-based Monte Carlo (MC) simulations of the $G. Dashed lines indicate the
percentage of optimal strategies in the Monte Carlo simulation decoupled along the direction of the price increase, whereas the dotted lines indicate
the percentage of optimal strategies against the direction of the price increase. The clear ‘‘peaks’’ in the dashed lines predict a price increase before it
can be seen in the experiment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050700.g003
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Figure S5 Screenshot of a representative game in time
step t= 5.
(TIF)
Figure S6 Screenshot of a representative game in time
step t=6.
(TIF)
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